Existence Is A Predicate

The most sustained counter-argument to the ontological arguments for the existence of God lies in the idea that existence is not a predicate, i.e. a "property" of the object called "God". Rather, existence is a matter of the ordinal, becuase nothing changes in the properties of an object whether four, ten or indeed none of the object actually exist. The ontological arguments assert that God is more perfect if He is existent, and thus existence as a positive property is a predicate of "God", a perfect being.

In order to show that indeed, God's existence which I state is necessary, or a logical "a priori" existence is predicate to the concept of a perfect being, I proceed as follows. First I draw a distinction between contingent existence which I familiarly know as my own mode, which indeed falls into matters of ordinality and to the contrary, the existence of God.

First, I assume that there is a difference between the contingently existent, which may or may not be eternal, and necessary existence.

If a being "x" may conceive of a being "G" that may exist ("be", as in "live" - I admit somewhat the existence of a "soul" to distinguish the living from the dead), or live for longer (prior to and/or afterward) than x, then I may ascend a chain of the age of such possible beings using Zorn's lemma to reach or choose the top bound of the poset, to a being that conceivably would exist forever. (though as yet is still a contingent being).

That is, every contingent being may consider the possibility of his own non-existence (in his being and inner person), so it is possible for him to infer the existence of another being that would "out live" himself. I ascend every possible chain of such beings and I may choose an eternal being that is truly "conceived as eternal". Now, though this may be only a hypothetical being, it is a logically possible and also most notably a logically conceivable one.

Some effort is made to qualify such existence with an equivalence relation, by only conceiving of beings G that may likewise conceive of x by reciprocation. More on this later in the site.

Now, if I now reverse the roles, if it were not possible for x to conceive of such a being G, then I logically arrive at the modus tollens, and it is then impossible for the being x to conceive of his own limited mortality. (I assume that all such x are capable. so (¬N(x)=>P(x~G)) <=> (¬P(x~G) => N(x))

In fact, I totally skirt aside the issue of necessary existence by inferring that x is unable to conceive of an end to his own contingent existence, and I state that the modus tollens logically so derived states that x may only conceive of himself as necessarily existent, (though necessary logically rather than in actuality; as x surely has no concept of his finite existence.) Or rather for all of our benefit here, that x is not able to conceive of his own non-existence. Whilst this is not in truth equivalent to necessary existence, the difference is made between "logically existent", and "not conceived as logically non-existent".

Now I have an impasse, for by construction x is contingent and merely unable to come to terms with it: whereas G in reciprocating to x, were G in truth eternal, G could only conceive of one such being, namely the remaining necessary one, which by the modus tollens as above, would become by inclusion G Himself in the person of God alone.

G, unable to consider a being with longer life than His own, logically is unable to conceive of his own non-existence.

So, is G then necessarily existent?

Ascending a chain of contingently existent "G" leads us to an eternal yet contingent G that is unable to logically conceive of His own non-existence. Now, if no possible x (by virtue of predicating G with necessary existence) could correctly choose the perfect rather than the contingent, then G in reciprocating to Himself as an x, could not conceive of His own possible non-existence either.

Rather than examine every point of contingency, it is easier to write ¬N(x) => P(x~G) is equivalent to ¬P(x~G) => N(x) and then x is such a G himself.

Yet if G is eternal and yet still contingent then if G conceives of a necessary being, I state that this is a positive property of some H found so, and is therefore a predicate. (Because necessary existence was not found ascending the chain in the poset but was chosen as necessary existence in H.) So P(G~H) => N(H) else ¬N(H)=>~P(G~H)=> N(G).

So, by definition of predicate, I infer necessary existence is found as an essence in God, that if ¬P(x~H) then N(x) rather than x being simply unaware of his finite mortality. Thus, H chosen as necessary rather than eternal is more "perfect" than a "G" chosen merely as eternal from the poset. And, thus far, positive and necessary existence must be predicated to H to separate us suffering misidentification as to G.

That is to say, "necessary existence" is then both a positive property of the perfect "being" (as a "more perfect descriptor"), as well as a predicate that properly distinguishes the necessarily existent from the contingently existent. Then, "being" wins the predicate "existent" when both are perfect.

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